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ABSTRACT—In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme 
Court set forth a framework to identify the extraterritorial reach of a federal 
statute. The Supreme Court required that a statute demonstrate 
congressional intent to apply to extraterritorial conduct. Under this 
framework, federal courts have found that civil RICO does not apply to 
extraterritorial conduct. However, the courts have been inconsistent in their 
analysis of RICO under Morrison. Some courts have found that RICO does 
not apply to extraterritorial enterprises while others have found that RICO 
does not apply to extraterritorial conduct. But the courts have been 
consistent in saying that Morrison precludes some extraterritorial 
application of civil RICO. This analysis is inconsistent with the Morrison 
framework and ignores the text and legislative history of RICO. The text of 
the RICO statute provides no limitation on the application of the law to 
extraterritorial conduct. Further, the extraterritorial limitation is 
inconsistent with the congressional directive to liberally construe the statute 
to effectuate its remedial purpose—to limit the impact of organized crime. 
In the text and history of civil RICO, Congress clearly indicated that the 
statute should apply extraterritorially. 
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In 1951, ABC, NBC, and CBS interrupted their regular programming 
to carry the United States Senate hearings on the investigation of organized 
crime in the United States.1 For over sixty years, Americans had heard 
stories about organized crime, but these hearings were the first public 
acknowledgment of the murdering of witnesses and corruption of public 
officials associated with the Mafia.2 At that time, efforts to curtail mob 
activity failed. Law enforcement suffered from corruption, a lack of 
resources, and a failed understanding of the American Mafia.3 
In 1970, Congress recognized that organized crime drained billions of 
dollars from the United States’ economy every year and that current legal 
remedies were insufficient to combat the problems.4 In response, Congress 
enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 19705 
(RICO) as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 19706 (OCCA). 
Congress designed RICO with both criminal7 and civil8 provisions in an 
 
1 See THOMAS REPPETTO, AMERICAN MAFIA: A HISTORY OF ITS RISE TO POWER ix (2004). 
2 Id. at ix–x. 
3 Id. at xii–xiii. 
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1–2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073, 1073. 
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). 
6 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. 
7 Section 1963 provides criminal penalties that include fines, forfeiture of property, and 
imprisonment. 
8 Section 1964 provides for civil remedies that include injunctive relief and treble damages. 
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effort to provide more effective tools to eliminate the influence of 
organized crime on legitimate businesses.9 
Over time, law enforcement agencies and plaintiffs began using RICO 
to reach groups beyond the original aim of the statute, the American Mafia. 
RICO is now used as a tool against legitimate enterprises,10 white-collar 
criminals,11 and organizations with a social or political agenda,12 in addition 
to the American Mafia.13 Because of the broad range of defendants and 
strong remedies available, civil RICO claims have become popular among 
plaintiffs.14 
Unfortunately for those plaintiffs, civil RICO was not popular among 
lower courts, which regularly applied RICO law restrictively and dismissed 
a “vast majority” of civil RICO claims prior to trial.15 Recently, lower 
courts have attacked RICO by dismissing claims involving “extraterritorial 
conduct”—conduct occurring outside the United States. Finding that civil 
RICO lacks extraterritorial application, lower courts have dismissed 
numerous RICO claims. 
The extraterritoriality attack on civil RICO stems from a framework 
set forth in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. In Morrison, the 
Supreme Court held that a statute cannot be applied to extraterritorial 
conduct unless there is a “clear indication” in the statute that Congress 
intended extraterritorial application.16 Thus, a court must examine the 
statute’s language to determine whether Congress intended that the statute 
apply to extraterritorial conduct.17 
 
9 See Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S.30, and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control 
of Organized Crime in the United States, Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
91st Cong. 106–07 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Hearings] (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan) 
(discussing the limitations of existing laws to combat the criminal influences over legitimate 
businesses). 
10 See Unites States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (“On its face, [RICO] appears to include 
both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope . . . .”). 
11 See, e.g., Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1411 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“[T]o the extent RICO 
is used as a weapon against ‘white collar crime’, this purpose is not contrary to the intent of Congress 
but is in fact one of the ‘benefits’ Congress saw the Act as providing.”). 
12 In a RICO case against a group alleged to have been using threatened or actual force to shut 
down abortion clinics, the Supreme Court held that there need not be an economic motive to state a 
claim under RICO. See Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 253, 256–61 (1994). 
13 See, e.g., Arnold H. Lubasch, Gotti Guilty of Murder and Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
1992, at A1 (late edition) (discussing the RICO conviction of famous mobster John Gotti). 
14 Estimates of the extent of civil RICO filings range from 4% to 17% of all federal filings. See G. 
Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and 
the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is This the End of RICO?,” 43 VAND. L. REV. 
851, 870–71 (1990). 
15 Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White-Collar Crime: The Ironic Demise of Civil 
RICO, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (1993). 
16 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
17 See id. at 2881–83 (examining section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to determine 
if Congress gave a clear indication that the statute was to apply to extraterritorial conduct). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1378 
Lower courts have begun to apply the Morrison framework to civil 
RICO claims. The Second Circuit addressed the issue in Norex Petroleum 
Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc. and held that civil RICO did not have 
extraterritorial application.18 After Norex, a number of district courts 
followed the Second Circuit’s holding that civil RICO does not apply to 
extraterritorial conduct.19 The Norex reasoning allows district courts to 
clear their dockets of complex extraterritorial RICO claims. However, a 
careful analysis of RICO and the legislative history of the OCCA indicates 
that courts should not limit RICO to domestic conduct because the statute 
clearly demonstrates Congress’s intent that courts apply RICO 
extraterritorially. 
Part I provides an overview of civil RICO and the rationale for passing 
the law. It demonstrates the effect of racketeering on interstate and foreign 
commerce and Congress’s desire to provide more effective means to 
combat the problem of racketeering regardless of whether that racketeering 
occurred in the United States or abroad. Part II examines the Morrison 
framework for the extraterritorial application of federal statutes. This Part 
shows that the clear indication test does not require a direct statement of 
extraterritoriality in the statute but can be inferred from the text, purpose, 
and design of the statute. Part III analyzes the current case law regarding 
the extraterritorial application of civil RICO and argues that civil RICO 
should apply to extraterritorial conduct. Given the purpose in passing the 
Act, the direct statement that RICO applies to racketeering by organizations 
engaged in “interstate or foreign commerce,”20 and the extraterritorial reach 
of the predicate acts, Congress intended for RICO to apply 
extraterritorially. A brief Conclusion follows. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RICO 
A. The Foundation of RICO 
In 1970, Congress considered organized crime to be a tremendous 
drain on the United States’ economy and legal system. Organized crime 
siphoned billions of dollars from the economy every year.21 Representative 
William McCulloch described the economic size of organized crime as 
larger than “[i]f U.S. Steel, American Telephone & Telegraph, General 
Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Electric, Ford Motor Co., 
IBM, Chrysler, and RCA all joined together into one conglomerate 
 
18 631 F.3d 29, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
19 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“RICO does not 
apply extraterritorially.”); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 
2011) (“[T]here is no evidence that Congress intended to criminalize foreign racketeering activities 
under RICO.”). 
20 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d) (2006). 
21 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073, 1073. 
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merger.”22 In response, Congress passed OCCA to provide stronger legal 
tools in the evidence-gathering process and more effective penalties for 
those involved in organized crime.23 Two specific shortcomings in the 
current laws emerged: first, criminal procedure provided significant 
protections for those who illegally influenced enterprises; and second, 
criminal sanctions were generally limited to fines and imprisonment.24 In 
answer, Congress included RICO in OCCA, in part to stop criminal 
influences on legitimate enterprises.25 
B. The Structure of RICO 
RICO prohibits four activities: (1) investing the proceeds of a pattern 
of racketeering activity in an enterprise,26 (2) acquiring any interest in or 
control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity,27 
(3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity,28 and (4) conspiring to violate any of the previous provisions.29 
Each one of these prohibited activities is criminalized only to the extent 
that it affects “interstate or foreign commerce.”30 Much RICO litigation has 
focused on the construction of a few of these terms—“a pattern of 
racketeering activity,” “an enterprise,” and “affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce.” 
1. A Pattern of Racketeering Activity.—A plaintiff must prove that a 
defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to succeed in any 
RICO claim. RICO defines a “pattern of racketeering activity” as 
“requir[ing] at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which 
occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which 
occurred within ten years . . . after the commission of a prior act of 
racketeering activity.”31 The use of “requires” rather than “means” (as is 
used in other definitions32) in the section may imply that two acts of 
racketeering within ten years of each other are necessary to describe a 
 
22 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 78 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch). 
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1073. 
24 1970 Hearings, supra note 9. 
25 See id. at 106. 
26 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006). 
27 Id. § 1962(b). 
28 Id. § 1962(c). 
29 Id. § 1962(d). 
30 Id. § 1962(a)–(d). 
31 Id. § 1961(5). 
32 See, e.g., id. § 1961(2) (“‘State’ means any State of the United States . . . .”); id. § 1961(7) 
(“‘[R]acketeering investigator’ means any attorney or investigator so designated . . . .”). 
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pattern of racketeering activity but may not be sufficient.33 This ambiguity 
has led many lower courts to impose stricter limitations on the pattern 
element of a plaintiff’s RICO claim than two racketeering acts within ten 
years of each other.34 
Congress created an expansive definition of racketeering activity 
within RICO. Under the statute, only a detailed list of offenses and 
behaviors qualify as racketeering activity. These activities, often called 
predicate acts, comprise two major categories. The first category includes 
certain state felonies including murder, kidnapping, and arson.35 The 
second category includes a series of offenses outlawed by federal statutes 
including, inter alia, bribery, wire fraud, mail fraud, and money 
laundering.36 This list of predicate acts is exhaustive, and plaintiffs may not 
add to (nor may defendants subtract from) the offenses that constitute a 
pattern of racketeering activity.37 By requiring two or more predicate acts to 
state a RICO claim, the statute requires plaintiffs to allege not only a 
criminal enterprise but also the elements of each predicate act they claim 
constitutes a part of the pattern of racketeering activity.38 
2. The Enterprise.—A pattern of racketeering activity must 
somehow connect to “an enterprise.” The pattern can be conducted to the 
detriment of, through, or for the benefit of an enterprise.39 RICO defines an 
enterprise as “includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”40 Unlike the list of predicate 
acts, the enterprise definition uses “include” rather than “means,” so it is 
 
33 See Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (“The implication is that 
while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance two of anything 
do not generally form a ‘pattern.’”). 
34 See Michael Goldsmith, Resurrecting RICO: Removing Immunity for White-Collar Crime, 
41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 294 (2004) (“Even under [a] relaxed standard . . . many courts continued to 
dismiss RICO complaints for failure to allege a proper pattern of racketeering activity. Rather than 
viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the pleading party, these courts read artificial 
temporal or other requirements into the pattern element and assumed that the plaintiff could not adduce 
evidence at trial to satisfy these requirements.”). 
35 See § 1961(1)(A) (“‘[R]acketeering activity’ means any act or threat involving murder, 
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a 
controlled substance . . . which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more 
than one year . . . .”). 
36 See id. § 1961(1)(B)–(E). 
37 The definition of racketeering activity uses the more restrictive “means” instead of “includes” or 
“requires.” See id. § 1961(1). 
38 For example, in Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
corporation committed multiple acts of mail and wire fraud. See 473 U.S. at 483–84. The plaintiff was 
required to allege each element of mail and wire fraud under the applicable federal statute and the RICO 
elements under § 1962. See id. at 496–97, 500. 
39 See § 1962(a)–(d). 
40 Id. § 1961(4). 
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nonexhaustive.41 A RICO enterprise includes both legitimate and criminal 
enterprises.42 This means that the traditional American Mafia could be an 
enterprise under RICO, but so could a legitimate business organization. 
Congress broadly defined the RICO enterprise, giving maximum flexibility 
to law enforcement agencies and plaintiffs to file suit against any 
organization or group that can obtain property.43 
To distinguish the enterprise element from the pattern-of-racketeering-
activity element, courts created certain standard elements to establish proof 
of a group of individuals associated in fact. These elements include: (1) “a 
common or shared purpose,” (2) a “continuity of . . . structure and 
personality,” and (3) “an ‘ascertainable structure’ distinct from that 
inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity.”44 These 
elements distinguish a group of individuals associating for the sole purpose 
of committing a crime from a group of people committing crimes in the 
furtherance of an enterprise. 
The goal of the RICO enterprise (or the pattern of racketeering 
activity) need not be economic in nature. In National Organization for 
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, the Supreme Court held that an enterprise need 
not have an economic goal to violate RICO.45 In that case, the National 
Organization for Women sued a group of antiabortion protesters for efforts 
designed to interfere with the operation of clinics and to “persuade women 
not to have abortions.”46 The antiabortion protesters argued that because 
their motives were not economic in nature, civil RICO did not apply to 
their conduct.47 The Court held that, similar to the legitimate-versus-illicit-
enterprise distinction, Congress did not require that an enterprise have an 
economic motive.48 The Supreme Court thus broadly construed RICO 
terms, which is consistent with the legislative directive contained within 
OCCA to liberally construe provisions to effectuate the Act’s remedial 
purposes.49 
 
41 Compare id. § 1961(1), with id. § 1961(4). 
42 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981) (“There is no restriction upon the 
associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact. On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate 
enterprises within its scope . . . . Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it could 
easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, ‘legitimate.’”). 
43 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 56 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4032. 
44 United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 
626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
45 See 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994). 
46 Id. at 252–53. 
47 See id. at 258. 
48 See id. at 260–61. 
49 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (“The 
provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”). 
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3. Affecting Interstate or Foreign Commerce.—The final element of 
a civil RICO violation is that the prohibited act must affect interstate or 
foreign commerce.50 From the inception of OCCA, Congress was 
concerned with the effect of racketeering on American business people, 
investors, and companies.51 Thus, RICO focuses on the pattern of 
racketeering activity to the extent that it affects interstate or foreign 
commerce.52 
C. The Unique Remedies of RICO 
RICO provides a statutory framework that avoids some of the 
difficulties law enforcement agencies and district attorneys faced in 
combating organized crime. Prior to RICO, criminal infiltration of an 
enterprise was subject to higher procedural and evidentiary burdens of 
criminal law.53 Further, the only remedies available for the criminal 
infiltration of an enterprise were fines and imprisonment.54 Because RICO 
contains provisions for both criminal and civil sanctions, the expansive 
remedies available and lower procedural and evidentiary barriers offer 
courts greater flexibility to disrupt the activities of a criminal enterprise.55 
The availability of civil sanctions allows a private citizen or the United 
States to file suit without the defendant gaining the strong protections that 
apply in a criminal case.56 For example, criminal cases require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and evidence collection requires a warrant or 
strict adherence to procedural requirements. In contrast, civil suits merely 
require proof by a preponderance of the evidence and have a more liberal 
discovery process.57 Furthermore, the remedies in a civil suit include treble 
damages and reasonable attorney’s fees, and could subject the violators to 
divesture of assets in an enterprise, dissolution or reorganization of the 
enterprise, and other equitable remedies.58 Criminal sanctions, conversely, 
are often limited to fines and imprisonment. The broad range of civil 
remedies thus allows a judge to determine the most effective way to stop 
the criminal activity. 
 
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d) (2006). 
51 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. at 923 (“[O]rganized crime activities in the 
United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and 
competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign 
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its 
citizens . . . .”). 
52 This provision is also likely a hook to establish federal jurisdiction over the prohibited conduct. 
53 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 106. 
54 See id. at 107. 
55 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968. Section 1963 provides criminal penalties, and § 1964 provides for 
civil sanctions. 
56 See id. § 1964. 
57 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 106. 
58 See § 1964(a), (c). 
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RICO operates differently than many other criminal or civil statutes. 
RICO focuses not on the individuals committing criminal activities but 
rather on the criminal enterprises.59 As a result, RICO targets the 
foundation of the criminal activity—the criminal enterprise—and can more 
effectively eliminate the problem of organized crime. Without RICO, 
prosecutors and harmed individuals could only prosecute individual 
members of a criminal organization.60 Such members are easily replaced in 
a sophisticated organization. By focusing on the enterprise, RICO can 
disrupt the organization itself. Thus, it becomes more effective in 
eliminating systemic crime than statutes that focus on an individual. 
Just as Congress created a system with a broad range of remedies to 
protect business from corrupt influences, Congress did not limit the 
territorial scope of the statute. Congress did not limit the definition of 
enterprise to a domestic one. Nor did Congress limit commerce to interstate 
commerce. Despite no indication that Congress intended to limit the scope 
of the enterprise or the definition of commerce domestically, courts have 
begun to read those limits into the statute under a theory that the statute 
lacks extraterritorial application.61 
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF FEDERAL STATUTES 
A. Foreign RICO Applications Before Morrison 
The broad wording of the RICO statute coupled with a global 
economy led to cases against foreign defendants for activity that occurred 
in a foreign country. Even before the Supreme Court set forth the 
extraterritoriality framework in Morrison, these cases saw several 
procedural challenges raised by defendants regarding the applicability of 
RICO to their conduct. 
The first hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome was to show that RICO 
applied to foreign enterprises. Although the statute itself makes no 
distinction between a foreign or domestic enterprise,62 defendants argued 
that a foreign enterprise fell outside the definition of a RICO enterprise.63 
Courts rejected this argument and denied motions to dismiss by foreign 
 
59 RICO outlaws a pattern of racketeering behavior only to the extent that such behavior is part of 
or benefits an enterprise. See id. § 1962. 
60 See Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 5–8. 
61 See infra Part III.A. 
62 RICO prohibits a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with “any enterprise which is 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” E.g., § 1962(a) (emphasis 
added). Subsections (b) and (c) contain the same language. See id. § 1962(b)–(c). Further, enterprise is 
defined to include “any . . . corporation.” Id. § 1961(4) (emphasis added). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438–40 (2d Cir. 1974) (denying the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because RICO applies to both domestic and foreign 
enterprises). 
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defendants,64 and such rulings were consistent with the broad construction 
the Supreme Court had given RICO.65 With the broad interpretation of 
RICO afforded by courts and the wording of the statute, prior to Morrison, 
RICO applied to foreign enterprises. However, other difficulties impeded 
successful RICO claims brought against foreign defendants. 
Among the issues facing a plaintiff’s RICO claim against a foreign 
enterprise are jurisdictional and procedural issues that prevent successfully 
pleaded claims from going forward. Plaintiffs have difficulties establishing 
personal jurisdiction over and properly serving foreign defendants.66 And 
even if a plaintiff could win a verdict after clearing all pretrial hurdles, they 
might not have been able to enforce a judgment against a foreign 
defendant. Sometimes efforts to enforce a judgment affect a nation’s 
sovereignty.67 Additionally, differences in damages calculation allowed by 
a foreign country could also derail efforts to collect final judgments.68 
These procedural issues remain difficult for plaintiffs to overcome. 
However, these issues are now secondary to arguing that RICO should 
apply extraterritorially under the Morrison framework. 
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
In 2010, the question of how to apply federal statutes to extraterritorial 
conduct reached the Supreme Court. In Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., a group of foreign investors sued an Australian banking 
corporation for violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.69 The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on three grounds: 
(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) failure to state a claim due to 
insufficient domestic actions alleged, and (3) section 10(b) did not apply to 
 
64 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Long v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 746, 
750–51 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (denying a motion to dismiss by a foreign defendant). 
65 See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256–61 (1994) (rejecting a 
narrow view of the purpose of an enterprise in favor of a broad view encompassing more than just 
economic motives); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (rejecting a narrow 
interpretation of the term “enterprise” in favor of including both illicit and licit enterprises within the 
definition). 
66 See generally Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and “ET,” 
73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1051–67 (1989) (discussing the procedural difficulties faced by plaintiffs in 
extraterritorial civil RICO suits). 
67 See id. at 1070–71 (“Nations perceiving United States extraterritorial jurisdiction as a threat have 
taken measures to defeat enforcement of judgment and discovery orders. Such measures usually are 
accomplished through statutes that block enforcement of foreign laws, regulations, or court orders. At 
least sixteen nations, including the United Kingdom and Australia, have enacted legislation of this 
type.” (footnotes omitted)). 
68 See id. at 1071–72 (explaining that multiple countries use “claw-back” provisions to allow for a 
defendant to recover some of a multiple damages award enforced in a foreign nation such as the treble 
damages provision of RICO). 
69 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875–76 (2010). Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
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extraterritorial conduct.70 The Second Circuit found insufficient domestic 
acts and held that section 10(b) did not apply to extraterritorial conduct.71 
As a result, the lower courts dismissed the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.72 
1. Extraterritoriality as a Canon of Construction.—In its review of 
the case, the Court clarified the Second Circuit’s ruling73 and then went on 
to deal with the extraterritoriality problem. The Court first looked at the 
theory of a strict domestic application of federal statutes. The Court held 
that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”74 The Court clarified that 
the concept of extraterritorial application (or lack thereof) is “a canon of 
construction, or a presumption about a statute’s meaning,” and not a 
limitation on Congress’s power.75 Any federal statute is presumed to not 
have extraterritorial application: “When a statute gives no clear indication 
of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”76 Thus, for a federal statute to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application, Congress 
must provide a “clear indication” of extraterritorial application within the 
statute. 
A clear indication of extraterritorial application is different from a 
“clear statement” of extraterritorial application. A clear statement would be 
an explicit statement in the text that the statute applies extraterritorially.77 
However, a clear indication test does not require an explicit reference to 
extraterritoriality. In Morrison, the Court held that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality does not require a clear statement from Congress to be 
overcome.78 Rather, the context of a federal statute and other sources of 
statutory meaning can be consulted to “give ‘the most faithful reading’ of 
 
70 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
71 See id. at 2877. 
72 See id. at 2876. 
73 The Supreme Court first clarified that any dismissal due to a statute lacking extraterritorial 
application is not a question of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 2876–77. Rather, asking what 
conduct a statute reaches is asking what conduct a statute prohibits, and that question is one of the 
merits. See id. at 2877. On the contrary, a subject matter jurisdiction question relates to a court’s “power 
to hear a case.” Id. at 2877 (quoting Union P. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. 
Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009)). Thus, a dismissal for a statute’s lack of 
extraterritorial application would fall under the auspices of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim. See id. 
74 Id. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 2878. 
77 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (2006) (“There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct 
prohibited by this section.”). 
78 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
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the text” and to determine if there is a clear indication of extraterritoriality 
in the statute.79 
2. Application of the Clear Indication Test to Section 10(b).—When 
analyzing section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court held that it was not 
for the courts to decide whether Congress would have wanted the statute to 
apply to extraterritorial conduct.80 Rather, the presumption against 
extraterritorial application applies to all federal statutes.81 In Morrison, the 
plaintiffs sued under Rule 10b-5,82 which is bound by the limits of section 
10(b)—thus, the Rule’s extraterritorial application was also limited to the 
extent of section 10(b)’s application.83 
Applying the clear indication framework to the Exchange Act, section 
10(b) does not have extraterritorial application.84 First, the text of the 
statute does not, on its face, suggest extraterritorial application.85 In fact, it 
appears that Congress was more concerned with the use of manipulative 
and deceptive devices within the United States than on exchanges in 
foreign countries.86 
The plaintiffs made three arguments that the statute applied to 
extraterritorial conduct. First, the plaintiffs argued that because “interstate 
commerce” includes “trade, commerce, transportation, or 
communication . . . between any foreign country and any State,” the statute 
evinces an intent to apply to foreign conduct.87 But historically the Court 
has not found that a broad definition of commerce implies that Congress 
intended the statute to apply to foreign conduct.88 “The general reference to 
 
79 Id. (quoting id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
80 See id. at 2878–81. 
81 Id. at 2881. 
82 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use of deceptive or manipulative devices 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. See id. 
83 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881. This assumption of the referenced statute’s extraterritorial 
application may leave open a door for plaintiffs to use cross-referencing statutes to assume the 
extraterritorial application of one for the benefit of another. However, it is unclear whether the 
regulation received the extraterritorial application of the statute because it was a regulation (and not a 
statute promulgated by Congress) or because it was limited to the extent of the statute as per prior law. 
See id.; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) (noting that rule 10b-5 “does not 
extend beyond the conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition”). 
84 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
85 Id. at 2881. 
86 The statute makes multiple references specifically to national securities exchanges. See 15 
U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of any means or instrumentality 
of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use 
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
87 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (alteration in original) (quoting § 78c(a)(17)). 
88 See id. 
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foreign commerce in the definition of ‘interstate commerce’ does not defeat 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.”89 
The plaintiffs also argued that the description of the purpose of the 
Exchange Act indicates that “prices established and offered in such 
transactions are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United 
States and foreign countries,” and that this language shows that the statute 
was meant to apply to extraterritorial conduct.90 However, the Court 
pointed out that the language “such transactions” actually specifies 
transactions that affect the “national public interest.”91 The Court held that 
“[t]he fleeting reference to the dissemination and quotation abroad [of 
securities prices] cannot overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”92 
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that certain sections of the Exchange Act 
restrict the use of the Act abroad; thus, the lack of such restrictions on 
section 10(b) indicates that that portion of the statute should be applied 
extraterritorially.93 The Court rejected this argument because it represents 
only one possible interpretation of the statute, and “possible interpretations 
of statutory language do not override the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”94 
A different provision in the statute provides specific extraterritorial 
application—section 30(a), which prohibits activities that affect foreign 
securities exchanges.95 However, the extraterritorial application of one 
section does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality of 
other sections.96 As a result, the Court found that there is no clear indication 
that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act applies to extraterritorial conduct. 
3. The Application of the Morrison Test Outside of the Exchange 
Act.—After the Court’s ruling in Morrison, lower courts have 
begun to apply the Morrison framework to laws other than the Exchange 
Act. Some examples of other federal statutes to which courts have applied 
the framework include the Torture Act,97 the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),98 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (quoting § 78b(2)). 
91 Id. (quoting § 78b). 
92 Id. 
93 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that section 30(b) of the Exchange Act, which outlined 
provisions under which the Act does not apply extraterritorially, suggests that the rest of the statute 
must apply extraterritorially. See id. 
94 Id. at 2883. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. (“Subsection 30(a) contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial effect. 
Its explicit provision for a specific extraterritorial application would be quite superfluous if the rest of 
the Exchange Act already applied to transactions on foreign exchanges . . . .”). 
97 See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 810–11 (11th Cir. 2010). 
98 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, slip op. at 7–14 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013); 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744–47 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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and civil RICO.99 Further, Morrison could have substantial impact on other 
laws that have yet to be challenged for lack of extraterritorial application.100 
Examining the application of Morrison to other federal statutes gives 
important insight into the breadth of the extraterritoriality analysis. 
Specifically, these cases indicate that the test goes beyond looking at the 
plain language of the statute to determine if Congress gave a clear 
indication of extraterritorial application. 
Faced with the question of whether the Torture Act applied to 
extraterritorial conduct in United States v. Belfast, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that the language of the statute clearly indicated that the Torture Act 
applied to conduct occurring outside of the United States.101 The language 
punishes “[w]hoever outside of the United States commits . . . torture”—
making it very clear that Congress intended to punish the behavior of 
actions outside of the Unites States.102 However, the court also explained 
that the intention to apply a statute extraterritorially may be inferred from 
the “nature of the harm” prohibited, the “international focus of the statute,” 
and the idea that prohibiting only “acts occurring within the United States 
would undermine the statute’s effectiveness.”103 In addition to its clear 
language, the Torture Act met all three of these inferential criteria for 
applying a statute extraterritorially.104 
The Ninth Circuit heard a challenge to the application of the ATS to 
extraterritorial conduct.105 Because the ATS itself is a jurisdictional statute, 
the challenge took the form of a dispute over the court’s jurisdiction.106 In 
finding that the ATS has extraterritorial application, the court found that 
there was a clear indication in the text of the statute that it applied to more 
than just domestic conduct.107 Further, the typical reasons for avoiding 
extraterritorial application of a statute—sovereignty infringement and 
 
99 See infra Part III. 
100 Commentators suggest that the Morrison decision could affect a number of different laws, 
including antitrust laws, employment laws, and environmental laws. See Stephen R. Smerek & Jason C. 
Hamilton, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
5 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 21, 30–33 (2011). 
101 See 611 F.3d at 811 (“The language of the Torture Act itself evinces an unmistakable 
congressional intent to apply the statute extraterritorially.”). 
102 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2006). 
103 Belfast, 611 F.3d at 811 (quoting United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 
2000)). 
104 See id. 
105 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2011). 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 746 (“[ATS]’s explicit reference to the law of nations indicates that we must look 
beyond the law of the United States to international law in order to decide what torts fall under its 
jurisdictional grant. Piracy was one of the paradigmatic classes of cases recognized under the ATS 
when it was enacted.”). As this Note was being finalized for publication, the Supreme Court held that 
the ATS does not reach extraterritorial conduct. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491, 
slip op. at 13–14 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2013). 
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foreign relations problems—did not exist with the ATS because it was 
written to reach only international norms rather than norms specific to the 
United States.108 These two factors suggested that “[t]here are strong 
indications that Congress intended the ATS to provide jurisdiction for 
certain violations of international law occurring outside the United States, 
and there are no indications to the contrary.”109 
Belfast and Sarei illustrate that the Morrison test is not a simple “plain 
language” statutory question. The Supreme Court chose to adopt the clear 
indication test instead of a more restrictive clear statement test. This 
Morrison test is a broader inquiry of legislative intent. Intent can be 
gleaned from the language of a statute,110 but it can also be learned from a 
more careful analysis of the purpose of the statute, the way the statute was 
constructed, the potential for conflict with a sovereign nation, and the effect 
of not applying the statute to extraterritorial conduct or enterprises. 
III. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF CIVIL RICO 
Courts have begun applying the Morrison framework to civil RICO. 
After a per curiam decision in the Second Circuit, all courts to consider the 
issue have (though under varied reasoning) come to the same conclusion: 
civil RICO should not receive extraterritorial application. However, the 
first court to come to this conclusion, and its stated rationale for directing 
other lower courts to dismiss extraterritorial RICO claims, lacked sufficient 
analysis of civil RICO under the Morrison test. A careful analysis of civil 
RICO under Morrison shows that RICO should apply to extraterritorial 
conduct and to foreign enterprises. 
A. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc. 
After the Morrison decision, the Second Circuit was the first court to 
address the application of civil RICO to extraterritorial conduct.111 In 
Norex, the court examined a plaintiff’s suit against defendants for 
conspiring to take control of a Russian oil company through a pattern of 
racketeering activity, some of which occurred in the United States.112 The 
district court had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because it found that RICO did not apply to extraterritorial conduct.113 The 
 
108 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 746. 
109 Id. at 747. 
110 A statement that “this statute applies extraterritorially” would be the most direct, but a statement 
that it prohibits certain conduct “outside the United States” is also sufficiently plain language to support 
extraterritorial application. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010). 
111 See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 30–31 (2d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam). 
112 See id. at 31. 
113 Id. at 32. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction was an error in the lower court’s analysis of the 
extraterritoriality application of federal statutes similar to the lower court’s decision in Morrison. The 
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Second Circuit found that “RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial 
application”114 and rejected arguments that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is overcome by either the extraterritorial reach of the 
predicate acts or by the reference to enterprises that “engage[] in, or that 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”115 Thus, the 
defendants succeeded in their motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.116 
After this decision, a number of district courts outside the Second 
Circuit responded to motions to dismiss RICO claims for failure to state a 
claim under the extraterritorial analysis of Morrison and Norex. Each 
district court’s decision came to a conclusion similar to Norex—finding 
that civil RICO lacked extraterritorial application.117 The rationale used by 
district courts to dismiss extraterritorial RICO claims falls into two 
different categories: either that Congress did not intend for RICO to 
criminalize extraterritorial activity118 or that the “focus” of the RICO statute 
is on the enterprise, and the statute gives no indication that RICO applies to 
foreign enterprises.119 
B. Application of the Morrison Framework to Civil RICO 
Despite these rulings, under the Morrison framework, civil RICO 
should apply to extraterritorial conduct and to foreign enterprises. No court 
has found that RICO applies extraterritorially. However, the statute itself 
indicates that it was not solely concerned with domestic activity or 
enterprises. The adoption of predicate acts with extraterritorial reach in the 
RICO framework, such as witness tampering or the assassination of foreign 
officials, evinces intent to apply RICO to more than just domestic conduct. 
Failing to apply civil RICO to extraterritorial conduct or enterprises would 
 
Second Circuit correctly framed the extraterritoriality question as one of the merits, not of a court’s 
power to hear a case. Id. 
114 Id. (quoting N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
115 Id. at 33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d) (2006)). Many of the RICO predicate acts contain 
explicit and implicit extraterritorial reach. For a list of predicate acts with such reach, see infra note 140 
and accompanying text. 
116 Id. at 33. 
117 See, e.g., Le-Nature’s, Inc. v. Krones, Inc. (In re Le-Nature’s, Inc.), WDPA No. 9-MC-162, 
MDL No. 2021, No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (holding that the 
“focus[]” of RICO is a domestic enterprise and that RICO would not apply to foreign enterprises); In re 
Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that RICO does not apply to 
foreign enterprises under Morrison); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 
(D.D.C. 2011) (holding that RICO does not apply extraterritorially). 
118 See, e.g., Philip Morris, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (“[T]here is no evidence that Congress intended 
to criminalize foreign racketeering activities under RICO.”). 
119 See, e.g., Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“RICO does 
not apply where, as here, the alleged enterprise and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are 
entirely foreign.”). 
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substantially impact the effectiveness of the statute. Finally, the policy of 
RICO indicates the law should be applied to extraterritorial conduct. 
1. RICO Applies Extraterritorially on Its Face.—The language and 
the structure of RICO indicate that Congress intended it to apply 
extraterritorially. Recall that a statute applies extraterritorially if there is a 
clear indication of congressional intent, which need not rise to the level of a 
clear statement. A statute should apply outside of the United States only if 
such a result arises from “the most faithful reading” of the text.120 The most 
faithful reading of RICO demonstrates that it should apply to 
extraterritorial conduct. 
RICO prohibits a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with 
“any enterprise” engaged in or affecting “interstate or foreign 
commerce.”121 The statute does not distinguish between foreign enterprises 
or domestic enterprises in its text. In fact, it applies to any enterprise. 
Congress neither limited the term “enterprise” in the operative portion of 
the statute nor in the definitions section of the statute.122 Further, 
Congress’s use of the word “includes” as opposed to “means” leaves the 
term “enterprise” as the most broadly defined word of all of RICO’s 
defined terms.123 
The Supreme Court recognized Congress’s intention to maintain a 
broad definition of a RICO enterprise. When faced with a decision to 
narrowly define a RICO enterprise to a more specific “licit” or “illicit” 
enterprise, the Court refused to limit the definition of an enterprise.124 
Similarly, had Congress intended to narrow the definition of “enterprise” to 
domestic enterprises, it could have inserted a single word: “domestic.” 
Rather than provide any limiting language on the type of enterprise reached 
by the statute, Congress kept the broadest phrase “any enterprise” in both 
the operative portion of the statute and the definitions. Congress intended 
that RICO apply to extraterritorial enterprises. 
Multiple courts, however, have found that the focus of the RICO 
statute is the enterprise and that RICO does not provide for suits against a 
 
120 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (quoting id. at 2892 (Stevens, 
J., concurring)). 
121 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
122 See id. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity[.]” (emphasis added)). 
123 Compare id. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 
id. § 1961(6) (“‘[U]nlawful debt’ means a debt . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
124 See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981) (“Had Congress not intended to 
reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a 
single word, ‘legitimate.’”). 
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foreign enterprise.125 In In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., the court analyzed the 
RICO statute to determine the focus of the law.126 Finding that the focus 
was the enterprise, the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to any 
foreign enterprise.127 The court in In re Toyota Motor Corp. took the same 
approach.128 The problem with these courts’ analyses is that they skip the 
clear indication analysis altogether. They both cite to Norex and conclude 
that RICO does not contain evidence that Congress intended extraterritorial 
application. Norex has created an unfortunate domino effect of district 
courts (even those not bound by the Second Circuit’s decision) forgoing an 
in-depth analysis of RICO in favor of applying facts to a presumption 
against extraterritoriality. 
The correct analysis does not require an initial determination of the 
focus of the statute, rather it requires a determination of whether Congress 
gave a clear indication that the statute applies extraterritorially. The focus 
of the statute should not be looked at to determine what portion may be 
applied extraterritorially. But the focus may be useful in determining 
whether Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially at all. 
Regardless of the need to initially determine the focus of RICO, an analysis 
of the “any enterprise” language should lead to a conclusion that RICO 
applies to foreign enterprises. Moreover, other operative text in the statute 
supports the application of RICO to foreign enterprises. RICO prohibits a 
pattern of racketeering in connection with “any enterprise which is engaged 
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.”129 By 
specifically including the phrase “or foreign commerce,” Congress was not 
solely focused on domestic enterprises. The use of the disjunctive “or” 
means that Congress prohibited a pattern of racketeering activity in 
connection with an enterprise engaged in or affecting either interstate or 
foreign commerce. Consequently, Congress has prohibited activity in 
connection with enterprises that engage exclusively in foreign commerce.130 
Any domestic corporation that engages in foreign commerce would at a 
minimum affect, and very likely engage in, interstate commerce. If 
Congress had only intended that RICO apply to domestic enterprises, 
 
125 See, e.g., In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., WDPA No. 9-MC-162, MDL No. 2021, No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 
2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
126 In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, at *3. 
127 See id. 
128 See In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 914. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
130 Congress may, in addition, have been trying to reach enterprises and conduct related to 
commerce among foreign countries that affect the Unites States. Foreign commerce is not defined in 
RICO, but 18 U.S.C. § 10 defines it as “includ[ing] commerce with a foreign country.” The use of 
“includes” rather than “means” shows that foreign commerce must include more than just commerce 
with a foreign country. The only other type of commerce that could meet a description of foreign 
commerce would be commerce among foreign countries. 
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Congress could have limited the language to “engaged in or affecting 
interstate commerce.” The use of “or foreign commerce” gives a clear 
indication that RICO was intended for foreign as well as domestic 
enterprises. 
In fact, earlier versions of OCCA and RICO included a more restricted 
definition of interstate or foreign commerce. Earlier drafts of RICO defined 
“foreign commerce” as meaning “commerce between any State and any 
foreign country.”131 But Congress removed this definition from RICO in its 
final version, leaving the statute much broader in its application. Why did 
Congress leave foreign commerce undefined in the final version? It is not 
entirely clear, but it might be a result of the focus of the hearings on “La 
Cosa Nostra” (the Sicilian Mafia).132 Whatever the impetus, Congress chose 
to modify the statute and opted for the broader, undefined term “interstate 
or foreign commerce,” and courts should adhere to its plain meaning. 
Some courts have improperly rejected this analysis of the “interstate or 
foreign commerce” term in RICO due to a misinterpretation of Morrison.133 
Multiple courts discounted RICO’s use of “or foreign commerce” by citing 
the Morrison Court’s analysis of the definition of “interstate commerce” in 
the Exchange Act.134 However, the two seemingly similar terms in the 
statutes must be analyzed differently. First, the Court in Morrison 
specifically noted that “even statutes that contain broad language in their 
definitions of ‘commerce’ . . . do not apply abroad.”135 The Morrison Court 
was discrediting the use of the term “interstate commerce” as an indication 
of extraterritoriality because it only appeared in the definition section and 
not the operative portion of the statute. On the other hand, “interstate or 
foreign commerce” does not appear in the definitions section of RICO. 
Instead, RICO uses the term in the operative part of the statute.136 
Further, the Court in Morrison reasoned that concluding that section 
10(b) did not apply extraterritorially did not render the definition of 
interstate commerce meaningless because certain conduct between a 
 
131 H.R. 326, 91st Cong. § 2(3) (1969), reprinted in 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 719, 720. 
132 See, e.g., Harry Kelly, Kelly—Crime (First of a Series), in 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 418, 
419 (discussing Carlos Marcello, a Sicily native, and his impact on organized crime in Louisiana). 
133 See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (“Morrison forecloses that argument, noting that ‘we have repeatedly held that even statutes 
that contain broad language in their definitions of commerce do not apply abroad.’” (quoting Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 (2010))); Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 
471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]he Court [in Morrison] rejected the arguments . . . that section 10(b) 
applies abroad because its definition of ‘interstate commerce’ includes activities between ‘any foreign 
country and any State.’” (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882)). 
134 See Norex, 631 F.3d at 31; Cedeño, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473. 
135 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (emphasis added). 
136 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2006) uses the term specifically to describe activities that are 
prohibited to the extent that they are in connection with an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate 
or foreign commerce. 
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foreign country and a state would nonetheless be prohibited.137 However, to 
read RICO as not applying to foreign enterprises would render the “or 
foreign commerce” language superfluous because any domestic enterprise 
engaged in foreign commerce would almost certainly affect interstate 
commerce.138 On the face of the statute, RICO applies extraterritorially. 
2. Pattern of Racketeering Activity and Predicate Acts.—To 
construe RICO not to apply to extraterritorial conduct would be to ignore 
the extraterritorial reach of some of the predicate acts in the statute. RICO 
prohibits a “pattern of racketeering activity,” which is defined from a list of 
various state and federal statutes.139 Many of those predicate acts outlined 
in 18 U.S.C § 1961(1) have explicit extraterritorial applications.140 By 
prohibiting a pattern of racketeering activity, RICO prohibits a person from 
committing two or more of any of the list of predicate acts within a ten-
year period. Since many of those predicate acts can be committed in 
foreign countries or have explicit extraterritorial application (i.e., the 
predicate act’s statute explicitly states that there is extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over violation of the statute), RICO’s reference to those 
predicate acts adopts their extraterritorial application.141 
 
137 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 n.7. 
138 At the very least, a domestic corporation engaging in exclusively foreign commerce would 
require the use of certain domestic services to operate its business, whether it be electricity, 
transportation, or other general services that affect interstate commerce. 
139 See §§ 1961–1962. 
140 See, e.g., id. § 175(a) (“There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this 
section committed by or against a national of the United States.”); id. § 351(i) (“There is extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section.”); id. § 832(b) (“There is extraterritorial Federal 
jurisdiction over an offense under this section.”); id. § 1512(h) (same); id. § 1513(d) (same); id. 
§ 1751(k) (“There is extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct prohibited by this section.”); id. 
§ 2332b(e) (“There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction . . . .”). In addition to statutes that expressly 
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction, a number of the predicate acts criminalize activities that occur 
outside the United States. See, e.g., id. § 37(b)(2) (criminalizing violence at international airports); id. 
§ 229(c)(2)–(4) (criminalizing the development, possession, or use of chemical weapons outside the 
United States); id. § 1116(c) (criminalizing the murder of foreign officials); id. § 2281(b)(3) 
(criminalizing violence against maritime fixed platforms); id. § 2332f(b)(2) (criminalizing bombing of a 
public place, government facility, and public transportation system); id. § 2340A (“Whoever outside the 
United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years . . . .”). 
141 This is not to say that RICO would apply to any conduct that is committed overseas. If a 
plaintiff based an extraterritorial RICO claim on predicate acts that do not have extraterritorial 
application, the plaintiff would not be able to state a claim. To meet the pleading requirements for 
RICO, the plaintiff would have to properly plead the predicate acts as well as the elements of RICO. 
The plaintiff would not be able to properly plead the predicate acts under Morrison because the 
predicate acts must have a clear indication of extraterritorial application. As a result, the plaintiff would 
also fail to allege a pattern of racketeering activity, which would be fatal to the RICO claim. 
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Courts have erroneously attempted to analogize the extraterritorial 
reach of the predicate acts to section 30 of the Exchange Act.142 But this 
analysis runs contrary to the reasoning of Morrison. The Morrison Court 
found section 30 to limit the extraterritorial reach of the other sections in 
the Exchange Act.143 Section 30 of the Exchange Act outlines specific 
instances where the Act has extraterritorial application.144 The Court 
reasoned that if the entire act were to be given extraterritorial application, 
and section 10(b) in particular, there would have been no need to outline a 
specific provision for extraterritorial application.145 Since section 30 and 
section 10(b) are part of one statutory framework, the explicit 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in one section, by negative implication, 
eliminates the other sections from extraterritorial application.146 
The analogy of the predicate acts to section 30 of the Exchange Act 
does not hold. First, RICO and the predicate acts are part of different 
statutory frameworks. They were enacted separately and those statutes 
cannot, by negative implication, show that RICO does not have 
extraterritorial application. Unlike section 30 of the Exchange Act, 
Congress did not enact the predicate acts with the intent to strip or grant 
RICO of any jurisdiction. Many of the predicate act statutes were enacted 
before RICO was even drafted.147 Section 30, however, is part of the 
Exchange Act and outlined specific instances where the Act would or 
would not apply to foreign conduct. 
Second, RICO prohibits committing a pattern of predicate acts. This 
means that RICO is concerned with anyone committing multiple predicate 
acts in connection with an enterprise. Congress made RICO extraterritorial 
when it adopted predicate acts with extraterritorial application. RICO has 
adopted the provisions of those statutes as part of the burden of proving a 
pattern of racketeering activity, and it has thus adopted their extraterritorial 
application. RICO does not limit the type of the predicate act in any way.148 
Congress could have limited the scope of the predicate acts in multiple 
locations in RICO, but Congress left the definition broad. For example, 
Congress had the opportunity to define racketeering activity as “any 
 
142 See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (“Morrison similarly forecloses Norex’s argument that because a number of RICO’s predicate 
acts possess an extraterritorial reach, RICO itself possesses an extraterritorial reach.” (citing Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882–83 (2010) (“[T]he presumption against 
extraterritoriality operates to limit [section 30 of the Exchange Act] to its terms.”))). 
143 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 For an original list of the predicate acts, see H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 56–57 (1970), reprinted 
in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4032–33. 
148 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining “racketeering activity” as “any act” (emphasis 
added)). 
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domestic act” but chose not to. Congress could have limited a pattern of 
racketeering activity to two or more “domestic” predicate acts in its 
definition but, again, chose not to do so. Finally, in the operative portion of 
the statute, Congress could have prohibited a “domestic pattern of 
racketeering activity,” but did not. 
The decision to maintain a broad definition of the predicate acts works 
together with the broad definition of an enterprise and the disjunctive 
phrase “interstate or foreign commerce.” Taken together, RICO prohibits a 
pattern of racketeering activity—including foreign predicate acts—
affecting any enterprise, domestic or foreign, engaged in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce.149 The “most faithful reading” of RICO 
evinces the clear intent of Congress to apply RICO to domestic and 
extraterritorial conduct and domestic and foreign enterprises.150 
3. Failing to Apply RICO to Extraterritorial Conduct or Enterprises 
Undermines the Statute.—Failing to apply RICO extraterritorially 
would substantially undermine Congress’s intent in passing the statute. A 
court can infer extraterritoriality in a statute from “the nature of the harm” 
prohibited, the “international focus of the statute,” and the idea that 
prohibiting only “acts occurring within the United States would undermine 
the statute’s effectiveness.”151 Limiting the statute to domestic conduct and 
enterprises would counter Congress’s intentions by any of these metrics. 
The nature of the harm RICO was designed to remedy was the 
influence of organized crime on corporations and other enterprises.152 
Congress acknowledged that organized crime was growing because of 
“defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law . . . and because the 
sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily 
limited in scope and impact.”153 Thus, Congress passed OCCA (including 
RICO) to strengthen these tools and provide new remedies against 
organized crime.154 Even in 1970, business and commerce were becoming 
international in nature, and Congress created RICO to apply to any 
enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce.155 RICO prohibits this 
activity “without exception.”156 
Congress was so concerned with RICO being limited that it actually 
created a clause within OCCA that RICO was to “be liberally construed to 
 
149 See id. § 1962(a)–(d). 
150 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (quoting id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
151 United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Plummer, 
221 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
152 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 9. 
153 S. 30, 91st Cong. at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 2, 3. 
154 See id. 
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2006). 
156 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 57 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007, 4033. 
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effectuate its remedial purposes.”157 To limit RICO to only domestic 
applications would be counter to this liberal construction requirement. 
RICO was enacted with the focus of alleviating the effects of organized 
crime on the economy and businesses of the United States, but nowhere 
does Congress indicate that RICO was only applicable if those effects were 
caused by organized crime within the country. 
In fact, in the Senate Committee Hearings about the Organized Crime 
Control Act, Congress often referenced the “Cosa Nostra,” the Sicilian 
Mafia, as an example of the type of activity that Congress wanted to 
prevent.158 If RICO were not applicable to extraterritorial conduct, any 
activities committed in Sicily (or Mexico, Canada, or the Bahamas) would 
not be prohibited under RICO—substantially limiting the effect RICO 
could have on the harm caused by organized crime. 
Similarly, if RICO were limited to domestic enterprises, the 
government and citizens could only seek remedies against the domestic 
“cells” of the Sicilian Mafia or analogous criminal enterprises but could not 
sue the segments of the organizations outside of the country. Not being able 
to reach the entire organization in a suit or criminal prosecution is a 
primary reason Congress passed RICO. Prior to RICO, criminal 
prosecutions could only eliminate individuals in a criminal enterprise.159 In 
an organized criminal enterprise, individuals are replaceable. Likewise, if 
RICO only focused on domestic enterprises, RICO could eliminate parts of 
an international organization but could never reach the entire organization. 
Such an organization would be free to reform the domestic cell of an 
enterprise in the United States while remaining—in its foreign operations—
immune from RICO. This outcome runs counter to the reason Congress 
passed RICO—to eliminate the ongoing harm caused by criminal 
infiltration of legitimate businesses. 
The RICO statute also inherently recognizes the international nature of 
some organized crime. When selecting predicate acts to include in the 
definition of “racketeering activity,” many of the acts have an inherently 
international aspect to the crime.160 The international focus of many 
predicate acts, coupled with the fact that Congress enacted RICO with a 
focus on any enterprise—including those that only engage in interstate or 
 
157 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947. 
158 See 1970 Hearings, supra note 9, at 152, 157 (statement of John N. Mitchell, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States) (“Today, a greatly expanded Cosa Nostra, consisting of 24 groups or ‘families,’ operates 
in most of the States, in Mexico, in the Bahamas, in parts of Canada, and other regions of the world. . . . 
More and more frequently, members of the Cosa Nostra are seeking connections with legitimate 
business . . . .”). 
159 See supra Part I.C. 
160 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. This does not give plaintiffs free rein to sue 
defendants for any extraterritorial activity. A RICO claim must still properly plead the predicate acts. If 
a predicate act does not have extraterritorial application under Morrison, then you cannot prove the 
predicate acts, which would eliminate any RICO claim. 
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foreign commerce161—shows that Congress was aware of the international 
nature of organized crime. As RICO was passed with international 
concerns clearly in mind, the statute should overcome any presumption 
against extraterritoriality. However, Congress never explicitly stated that 
OCCA or RICO were created to apply extraterritorially. In fact, in the 
Statement of Findings and Purpose on OCCA, Congress specifically 
mentioned the effects and activities of organized crime in the United 
States.162 But these statements do not indicate that Congress was only 
interested in organized crime in the United States. Rather, the effects in the 
United States brought the problem of organized crime to Congress’s 
attention. Congress wanted to alleviate these effects by passing OCCA and 
RICO. 
Exempting foreign enterprises from RICO creates difficulties with 
effective enforcement and the elimination of organized crime. First, 
criminal enterprises are able to exploit a loophole to continue their 
racketeering activity. Any organized crime syndicate simply has to locate 
its enterprise outside of the United States to avoid any and all difficulties it 
would normally encounter under RICO.163 Under this structure, an 
organization located in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean could commit 
wire or mail fraud against individuals in the United States and those 
victims (and the United States government) would be without one of their 
most significant tools to combat organized crime.164 Similarly, a drug cartel 
in Colombia could perpetually traffic drugs into the United States with 
impunity, without fear of RICO.165 This result is contrary to the entire 
purpose of creating the RICO framework. 
4. Policy Considerations in Extraterritorial Application of  
RICO.—Eliminating the extraterritorial application of RICO 
statutes would severely limit an effective tool against organized crime. 
Eliminating RICO’s application is particularly limiting because the 
 
161 See supra Part III.B.1. 
162 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073, 1073. 
163 One court has indicated that in determining the location of the enterprise, a court should employ 
a “nerve center” test. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG) (VVP), slip 
op. at 10–12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). This would make enforcement even more difficult because then 
an organization would need only to locate its management outside of the United States but could have 
agents commit crimes in the United States while maintaining the criminal enterprise’s immunity from 
RICO. 
164 Instead, the affected individuals would have to bring suit and state a claim for each individual 
act of wire or mail fraud. A plaintiff would be without the substantial remedies offered by RICO. See 
supra Part I.C. 
165 Even if the Colombian drug cartel were not targeting the United States directly with its 
racketeering, to the extent the activity has an effect on foreign commerce, this activity should be within 
the auspices of civil RICO. The plaintiffs would likely face other hurdles, such as obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants, but properly pleading a RICO claim should not be one of the hurdles. 
See supra Part II.A. 
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international aspect of organized crime today is more apparent and difficult 
to combat. In 2008, the United States Department of Justice announced a 
new plan to combat a growing problem affecting the country—international 
organized crime.166 The report found that, recently, “international organized 
crime has expanded considerably in presence, sophistication and 
significance,” and organized crime is “now threaten[ing] many aspects of 
how Americans live, work and do business.”167 The report also noted that 
“[i]nternational organized criminals do not need to reside in the United 
States to engage in criminal activities targeting the United States, its 
interests and its people.”168 The more sophisticated organizations can 
remain in countries that provide the criminals safety from arrest while 
continuing the criminal activities that affect the United States.169 
For exactly this reason, RICO must apply extraterritorially. Congress 
drafted OCCA as a statute with a broad purpose and language, and as such, 
RICO should be used against the most sophisticated of criminals. But if 
RICO were not to apply extraterritorially, even unsophisticated criminals 
would see an easy way to avoid the harsh punishments and penalties under 
RICO. 
Applying laws extraterritorially is not without controversy. 
Extraterritorial application of United States laws has led to the “withdrawal 
of foreign investment, [hurdles to] acquisitions and mergers, and damage to 
foreign relations.”170 Further, applying United States laws to individuals or 
organizations in foreign countries could be seen as a violation of that 
nation’s sovereignty.171 However, the federal judicial system deals with 
these issues by other means, including restrictions on personal jurisdiction, 
venue selection, and enforcing judgments against foreign defendants.172 
These other barriers to RICO claims provide protection to foreign 
sovereignty and foreign corporations without unnecessarily burdening 
RICO plaintiffs. The United States needs to be able to protect itself from 
foreign threats, and one of the only ways to do this is to apply certain laws 
extraterritorially. 
Criminals are already becoming so sophisticated that Congress is 
struggling to keep pace and ensure that new racketeering activities are 
included as predicate acts under the statute. Recent proposals to add 
 
166 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO COMBAT 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ioc-
strategy-public-overview.pdf. 
167 Id. at 1. 
168 Id. at 10. 
169 See id. 
170 Goldsmith & Rinne, supra note 66, at 1026–27 (footnotes omitted). 
171 See id. at 1029. 
172 See supra Part II.A. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1400 
computer crimes under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)173 have 
been presented to Congress.174 Criminal organizations have used computer 
fraud as a key part of their operations to steal identities and financial 
information.175 However, even if violations of the CFAA were added as 
predicate acts, if RICO has no extraterritorial application, the benefit of this 
expansion would be diminished.176 
Further, RICO becomes completely ineffective as a tool against 
terrorism if the statute lacks extraterritorial application. RICO predicate 
acts include “any act that is indictable under any provision listed in section 
2332b(g)(5)(B)”—a section of the Acts of Terrorism Transcending 
National Boundaries Act.177 But the current case law would prevent the 
application of RICO to foreign terrorist organizations.178 As a policy matter, 
to not apply RICO to extraterritorial conduct or foreign enterprises 
completely limits it as a tool that the United States and its citizens can use 
to combat organized crime. 
CONCLUSION 
RICO was designed to provide the United States and its citizens with 
more effective legal tools to protect against the significant impacts of 
organized crime. The statute was created with a broad purpose and has, 
despite numerous limiting attempts by lower courts, been consistently 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to give it broad effect. After Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., lower courts have again been narrowing the 
scope of RICO by dismissing claims against foreign enterprises or claims 
resulting from foreign conduct. 
But Morrison does not give lower courts carte blanche to dismiss any 
claim involving extraterritorial conduct. Rather, Morrison requires that the 
court analyze the statute and determine whether the “most faithful reading 
of the text” gives a “clear indication” that the statute should apply 
extraterritorially.179 The lower courts that have examined RICO under this 
framework have not provided the most faithful reading of the RICO statute 
in their analysis of its extraterritorial application. 
 
173 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
174 See Cyber Crime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyber Space and 
Combat Emerging Threats: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) 
(statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
175 See id. 
176 The CFAA was found to have extraterritorial application. See United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. 
Supp. 2d 367, 375 (D. Conn. 2001). 
177 § 1961(1). 
178 For background on the use of RICO as a tool to combat terrorism, see generally Irvin B. Nathan 
& Kenneth I. Juster, Law Enforcement Against International Terrorists: Use of the RICO Statute, 60 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 553 (1989). 
179 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (quoting id. at 2892 (Stevens, 
J., concurring)). 
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RICO applies to extraterritorial conduct. It applies to any enterprise. It 
applies to an enterprise engaged solely in or affecting only foreign 
commerce. And a large number of the predicate acts that constitute a 
“pattern of racketeering activity”180 are explicit in their application to 
extraterritorial conduct. 
RICO was enacted with concern for the harm to the United States 
economy caused by organized crime. That harm can exist if the criminal 
activity is committed within or outside of the United States. Through its 
reference to numerous extraterritorial predicate acts, RICO recognizes that 
many elements of a claim may occur outside the United States. 
This failure to apply RICO extraterritorially is also completely 
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute—to be a powerful tool against 
organized crime. Criminal enterprises are getting more complex and more 
sophisticated; failing to apply RICO to extraterritorial conduct gives them 
an easy way to avoid liability. The call to expand the predicate acts of 
RICO and the use of RICO against terrorists (or their financial backers) 
would be significantly hindered if RICO did not apply to foreign 
enterprises or extraterritorial conduct. RICO is targeted at stopping 
sophisticated, organized crime, and limiting its application to domestic 
conduct will create a dangerous loophole easily exploitable by 
sophisticated, organized criminals. 
 
180 § 1961(5). 
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